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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CLIFTON M. BOWDEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7478 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an intermediate appeal from the Honorable 
Judge Martin M. Larsen granting plaintiff a new trial 
from a judgment in favor of defendant and against plain-
tiff "no cause of action" (R. 229-230). The action was 
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Title 
45, Section 51 U. C. A. for injury allegedly sustained by 
plaintiff at Soldier Summit on December 21, 1951. Plain-
tiff alleged in his complaint the following grounds of negli-
gence: 
"1. That the defendant failed and neglected 
to use reasonable care to furnish plaintiff a reason-
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ably safe place in which to work in this: that the 
said defendant in the clearing of the snow from the 
tracks at Soldier Summit and in the vicinity where 
plaintiff was injured failed to clean the tracks a 
sufficient distance from the track in order that 
persons riding on the stirrups or side of the engine 
or cars could do so in safety and without having 
the said snow come in contact with them, thereby 
causing them to fall to the ground and be injured. 
"2. That the defendant negligently failed to 
have sufficient clearance between the side of its 
engine and the snowbank on the right side of said 
eastbound engine. 
"3. That the defendant negligently failed to 
warn its employees or to place any warning sign 
that there was insufficient clearance between the 
cars or engine and the snowbank at the side of the 
tracks at Soldier Summit where the plaintiff was 
injured" (Italics ours). 
Inasmuch as this is an intermediate appeal relating 
only to two instructions given by the Court the facts 
will be outlined only briefly. Plaintiff while working 
as a trainman in the yards at Soldier Summit in the 
early morning hours of December 21, 1951 was allegedly 
injured. The weather on that occasion was extremely cold 
and wintry and there had been many severe storms dur-
ing that month. At the time of the accident it was snow-
ing. This snow had been drifted by the wind which had 
been blowing during the night. Considerable testimony 
was introduced showing that the winter of 1951 and 1952 
had been unusually severe and that the Railroad. had had 
great difficulty in keeping its tracks at Soldier Summit 
cleared (R. 17). Cleaning crews were working day and 
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night to keep the main line and the passing lines cleared of 
snow and ice (R. 117). The track upon which the train was 
operating on which plaintiff was working at the time of the 
accident had been cleared of snow in the usual and custom-
ary manner a few hours prior to the accident. Railroad 
snow crews were working upon other tracks in the vicinity 
of Soldier Summit at the time the accident occurred (R . 
118-119). 
During the month of December the Railroad had hired 
many additional employees to aid in keeping the tracks 
clear of snow and ice (R. 116). The freight train with 
which plaintiff was working consisted of approximately 
80 cars. At the time of the incident complained of it was 
moving east into the passing track at Soldier Summit to 
allow a westbound train to pass on the mainline track. 
Soldier Summit is one of the highest points on the defendant 
Railroad. In movements east from the Summit trains move 
down grade. It was therefore necessary that retainers on 
the cars be set at Soldier Summit to control the speed of 
the train in its down grade movement (R. 14). 
Plaintiff testified that while he was standing on the 
side ladder of the engine waiting to step down from the 
·; · engine for the purpose of setting retainers on the cars the 
snow alongside the tracks pushed up against his feet caus-
ing him to fall from the engine and sustain his injuries 
:: (R. 17). He testified that there was an area of 100 feet in 
length at the point where this incident occurred where there 
was a close clearance between the snowbanks and the sides 
;: of the cars. 
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There was no evidence that the defendant Railroad 
had actual knowledge of the alleged close clearance be-
tween the snowbanks and the sides of the cars. Further-
more the testimony relative to the amount of clearance was 
conflicting. The testimony failed to show whether the snow 
which had created the alleged close clearance had drifted 
or fallen, or for that matter when it had drifted or fallen 
in said place. As herein indicated it was undisputed that 
the track where the accident occurred had been cleared of 
snow a few hours prior to the accident. In its instructions 
to the jury the trial court gave instructions 9 and 10, 
which instructions are as follows: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
"In order to find that the railroad was negli-
gent in failing to provide a safe place to work in this 
case, you must find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that 
"(1) The railroad knew, or by the exercise of 
reasonable care, should have known that 
there was snow or other substance near 
the tracks at the point of the accident, 
which snow or substance created a situa-
ation which was not a reasonably safe place 
for railroad workers to work; and 
"(2) That the railroad had a reasonably suf-
ficient period of time within which to elim-
inate said snow or substance and could 
reasonably have eliminated it, and failed 
to do so." 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
"In order to find that the railroad was negli-
gent in failing to warn plaintiff by warning sign or 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
otherwise of the alleged insufficient clearance be-
tween the cars or engine and the snow-bank at the 
side of the tracks near the point of the accident, 
you must find that 
"(1) There was in fact an insufficient clearance 
between the said cars or engine and the 
snow-bank; and 
"(2) That the railroad knew, or, by the exercise 
of reasonable care, should have known of 
said insufficient clearance and should rea-
sonably have known that it created an 
appreciable risk of harm to railroad work-
ers; and 
"(3) That the railroad had a reasonable op-
portunity to warn plaintiff of said condi-
tion, and failed to do so." 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant 
Railroad and against the plaintiff "no cause of action" and 
judgment was entered thereon. Thereafter a Motion for 
New Trial was made by plaintiff in which plaintiff claimed 
that Instructions No. 9 and 10 were erroneous. After argu-
ment on said Motion for New Trial the trial court took the 
matter under advisement and thereafter granted plaintiff a 
new trial expressly basing its decision upon the ground set 
forth in the memorandum decision found at page 229-230 
of the record. In this decision the Court isolated the 
grounds upon which it granted the Motion for a New Trial 
for the very purpose of giving this Court an opportunity to 
review by intermediate appeal. The Honorable Trial Judge 
in his written opinion in holding that Instructions No. 9 
and 10 were erroneous said: 
"Since this case was heard, the Supreme Court 
in this state has handed down his decision in the 
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case of Butz vs. Railroad Company,~- P. 2d. --
(not yet in Utah Reports). Under the language in 
that opinion, the Court concludes that Instructions 
9 and 10 in the Court's Charge to the Jury were 
erroneous, and, for that reason and upon that 
ground, plaintiff's motion for a new trial is grant-
ed, the judgment heretofore vacated and set aside, 
and the cause remanded to the trial calendar for re-
trial." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The .Trial Court erred in granting a Motion for New 
'.rrial on the grounds that Instructions Nos. 9 and 10 were 
erroneously given for the reason that said instructions cor-
rectly state the law applicable to the facts in the instant 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court specifically stated that because of 
Butz vs. Union Pacific Railroad Company, __ Utah _, 
(233 P. 2d 332,) which was decided after the instant case 
had been tried, ·he felt that instructions Nos. 9 and 10 had 
been erroneously given. 
In the Butz case, supra, the facts were briefly as fol-
lows: 
Plaintiff was injured while working as a switchman 
on the baggage trucks of the Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany. While riding on the side of a car he struck his back 
against a baggage truck which had been left so close to the 
tracks that it created a hazardous condition. It was assum-
ed in the court's opinion that the baggage truck had not 
been left in a dangerous position by agents of the Railroad 
Company but had been so left by third parties. 
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The Trial Court granted a non-suit apparently on the 
ground that there was no evidence showing that the de-
fendant Railroad was negligent and probably on the further 
ground that the evidence showed as a matter of law that 
the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was his own 
contributory negligence. Justice Crockett, writing for a 
majority of the Court consisting of Justices Wade and Mc-
Donough, held that the case should have been submitted to 
the jury on the question of defendant's negligence. The 
Court said: 
"There is abundant authority that a defendant 
employer is charged with responsibility for condi-
tions of danger upon the property of others of which 
it either has actual knowledge or is charged with 
constructive knowledge because the hazard is of such 
a nature and has existed for sufficient time that in 
the exercise of reasonable care the employer should 
have discovered it" (Italics ours). 
The Court further said : 
"The test is not whether afterward one may see 
a way that the injury could have been prevented but 
whether the Railroad in the exercise of ordinary 
prudence and care should have reasonably forseen 
the likelihood of injury. Under the circumstances 
in the instant case, this is a matter upon which 
reasonable minds could well differ" (Italics ours). 
The Court then quoted from Justice Black in the case 
of Wilkerson vs. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 
93 L. Ed. 497, wherein Justice Black said: 
"* * * respondent's argument held * * * 
that the Federal Act does not make the Railroad an 
absolute insurer * * * that proposition is cor-
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rect * * * the Act imposes liability only for 
negligent injuries. * * * But the issue of neg-
ligence is one for juries to determine * * *" 
(Italics ours) . 
Justices Wolfe and Lattimer dissented on the grounds 
that the non-suit was properly granted. 
We have no quarrel with the Butz case. It simply holds 
that the Trial Court should have permitted the case to go 
to the jury on the question of whether or not the defendant 
Railroad was negligent in failing to provide the plaintiff 
with a safe place to work. 
There is considerable difference between the Butz case 
and the instant case. The Butz case was not submitted to 
the jury; the instant case was submitted. The Court did 
not hold in the Butz case that the Union Pacific Railroad 
company had an absolute duty to furnish plaintiff with a 
safe place to work; it held that a jury should be permitted to 
find whether or not the Railroad negligently failed to pro-
vide a safe place to work. In the case at bar the jury was in-
structed that they could not so find unless the Railroad 
knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known of the dangerous condition allegedly existing. 
If the Butz case holds that a defendant is chargeable 
with something more than the exercise of reasonable care 
then the Butz case has established a rule of law of absolute 
liability. We are sure this was not the intention of this 
Honorable Court nor do we think a fair reading of that 
case so indicates. 
As herein indicated, evidence was introduced from 
which a jury could have found that snow alongside the 
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track had not been removed near a battery box stand for the 
' ' reason that the snowplow blade had to be pulled up at that 
point to avoid striking and damaging the box. Other evi-
dence indicated that newly drifted snow was accumulating 
alongside the track. The undisputed physical evidence show-
ed that plaintiff could not have encountered the snow left 
remaining near the battery box. This was established by 
the testimony of plaintiff, who stated that the battery box 
was approximately 25 to 30 car lengths from the point 
where the passing track joins the mainline at the east end 
of the yard (R. 41). Other witnesses testified that the 
battery box was more than 25 to 30 car lengths from the 
switch point. Mr. Hales, called by plaintiff placed it 50 
or 60 car lengths away (R. 82). The physical fact, shown 
by actual measurement is that the battery box was 1716 
feet west' of the dwarf signal which is at the point where 





The significance of this testimony is that the plaintiff 
testified that when the train came to a stop he was on the 
ground approximately 40 feet west of the tender (R. 46). 
Mr. Williams, the engineer, testified that the train in 
question consisted of an engine and tender on the head end 
pulling 88 mine empties followed by a caboose and helper 
engine. In all the train consisted of 92 cars, including the 
engines (R. 162). The time table shows that the passing 
track holds 105 cars (R. 129). The engineer further testi-
fied that it is customary to pull the train all the way into 
l ~ the passing track so that the rear end would not foul 
a1: the main line (R. 162). Following this custom he pulled 
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the engine all the way into the track until he reached the 
dwarf switch at the east end of the yard before he came 
to a stop (R. 162). This was almost a quarter of a mile 
from the battery box. How then could plaintiff have struck 
snow near this box? We are confident that the jury con-
cluded he did not. The only other snow near enough to the 
track to constitute a possible hazard was snow that may 
have accumulated by drifting along side the tracks in the 
early morning hours. 
The plaintiff testified that while he was standing in 
the snow and wind on the step of the engine all he could 
see was flying snow and steam ( R. 63) . He did not know 
whether there was one inch clearance or three feet (R. 63). 
The jury undoubtedly found that if plaintiff's foot en-
countered snow, as he testified, it was newly drifted snow 
that had accumulated during the early morning hours along 
the side of the track. The court by instructions Nos. 9 and 
10 in effect advised the jury that if this occurred the Rail-
road would not be liable unless the Railroad knew or in 
the exercise of reasonable care should have known that 
such drifts existed. If the case was to be submitted on 
the pleaded issue of negligence what other instruction could 
the court have given? If the court had failed to so instruct 
the jury could have found the Railroad liable simply be-
cause plaintiff's foot caught in a snowdrift. Such finding 
would be based on liability without fault unless the Rail-
road knew or should have known of the hazard so that it 
could have been prevented. 
It will be observed that the plaintiff alleged in his 
complaint certain grounds of negligence which had been set 
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out herein. In every instance the plaintiff alleges that the 
things which defendant did were done negligently. N egli-
gence means the doing or the failure to do what an ordinary 
reasonable man would not do or fail to do. 
We submit that there was clearly competent evidence 
from which the jury could very reasonably have found that 
the defendant did not know and could not reasonably have 
known of the existence of an alleged close clearance and the 
defendant had no reasonable opportunity to correct this 
condition or warn the plaintiff about it. We therefore 
believe that the Court's instructions correctly set forth de-
fendant's theory of the case and were based upon the com-
petent evidence supporting such theory. 
The Courts have consistently held that the plain-
tiff must prove that the Railroad either had actual 
knowlege of the alleged unsafe condition or that in the 
exercise of reasonable care the Railroad should have known 
of it. This we believe is exactly what was held in the Butz 
case, supra. 
In Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 940, 69 S. Ct. 
413, U. S. Supreme Court reiterated the rule that liability 
in Federal Employers' Liability case is based on fault. 
Justice Douglas, in a special concurring opinion, said : 
"the basis of liability under the act is and remains 
negligence. Judges will not always agree as to what 
facts are necessary to establish negligence." 
Justice Black, speaking for the majority of the Court, 
said: 
"There are some who think that recent decisions 
of this Court which have required submission of 
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negligence questions to a jury make, 'for all prac-
tical purposes, a railroad an insurer of its em-
ployees.' * * * This assumption, that railroads 
are made insurers where the issue of negligence is 
left to the jury, is inadmissible." 
The Federal Courts, in determining this question, have 
uniformly held that a railroad is responsible under the act 
for acts of negligence only where the act or omission is 
either known or something that the railroad in the exercise 
of reasonable care should have known. Thus in 0' Mara v. 
Penn. R. R. Co., 6 Cir. 95 F. 2d 762; and Hatton v. New 
York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 1 Cir. 261 Fed. 667, 
and as quoted in Kloetzer v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 95 N. E. 
2d 502; 341 Ill. App. 478, it is held: 
"Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 
a railroad company may be responsible to an em-
ployee for failing to provide a safe place to work, 
only if the company knew or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should have known of the unsafe 
condition." 
Other federal cases which so held are: 
Southern R. Co. v. Stewart, 115 F. 2d 317; 
Schilling v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., 114 F. 
2d 69; 
Saunders v. Longview, D. & N. R. Co., 296 P. 
835. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court's decision granting a new trial as 
herein indicated was based entirely on the court's con-
clusion that the Butz case had ruled that the Railroad could 
be held liable even though it did not know of the existence 
of the alleged hazard and even though it could not, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, have known of its existence. 
We believe, and have tried to show, that this Honorable 
Court did not so hold in the Butz case. All this Court held 
was that a jury should have been permitted to find whether 
or not the Union Pacific Railroad knew or should have 
known that a hazard existed by reason of close clearance 
caused by baggage trucks being left near the tracks. For 
these reasons we respectfully submit that the trial court's 
decision granting a new trial should be reversed and the 
jury's verdict of "no cause of action" be permitted to stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD A. ASHTON, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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